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ABSTRACT: This article explores the experiences of white workers on the Copperbelt
in Northern Rhodesia during World War II. Much of the existing literature on the
region focuses on African labour, yet the boom that began in the copper-mining
industry also attracted thousands of mobile, transient European workers. These
workers were part of a primarily English-speaking labour diaspora with a global
reach that linked mining centres around the world. The experience of this
workforce generated seemingly contradictory trends of labour militancy, political
radicalism, and racial exclusivity. A focus on two significant events during this
period will seek to examine how these trends shaped events on the Copperbelt: the
1940 wildcat strikes and the 1942 arrest and deportation of white mineworkers’
union leaders. These events shed light on the international world of European labour
and illustrate how the Copperbelt was linked to other mining centres around
the world.
“The eyes of the world are on the Copperbelt tonight”, proclaimed Jack
Hodgson, a shop steward of the white mineworkers’ union who would,
many years later, become a founding member of the armed wing of the
ANC (Umkhonto we Sizwe), standing before a riotous crowd of white
miners from Roan Antelope Mine in March 1940. Despite his pleas, the
meeting was unable to come to a decision over strike action and dissolved
into a series of brawls and acrimony.1 Days earlier, white mineworkers had
* The author would like to thank the Beit Fund of Oxford University and the Royal Historical
Society for providing funding for research trips to Zambia and South Africa in 2014. A version of
this article was presented as a paper at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, the University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and at the African Studies Association of the UK Conference,
Brighton, UK during 2014. I am grateful to these audiences for their comments and questions.
I would also like to thank the three anonymous referees and the Editorial Committee of this
journal for their insightful and useful comments.
1. Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Archive, Ndola [hereafter, ZCCM], 15.1.6E, Notes on a
meeting held at Luanshya Hotel on 22 March 1940. The notes were compiled by police officers
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walked out at nearby Mufulira and Nkana mines, the first wildcat strikes
that marked the beginning of several years of industrial unrest among the
white workforce on the Copperbelt.
Hodgson’s rhetorical flourish was an exaggeration, but wartime demand
for copper had brought the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia (now
Zambia) to global attention. This article explores the 1940 strikes and the
subsequent deportation of two leaders of the white mineworkers’ union in
1942. These events offer a window into the world of the primarily English-
speaking labour diaspora that linked mining centres around the world.
The international links of the region’s transient white population are
important in two senses. Firstly, they help explain the powerful combina-
tion of industrial militancy, political radicalism, and racial exclusivity that
came to dominate the Copperbelt – a combination that is captured, to a
certain extent, in Jonathan Hyslop’s concept of “white labourism” which
was coined with the situation before World War I in mind but which,
as I argue, can also be applied to later periods.2 Secondly, these links and
contacts had a practical dimension and were utilized to try and mobilize
support for the demands of these mineworkers across the world of
European labour.
In his 1999 article, Hyslop uses the mass demonstration in London in
1914 provoked by the deportation of white trade unionists from South
Africa to explore the idea of an international white working class not
composed of discrete national entities. This class was tied together by flows
of white migrants between settler colonies and dominated by an ideology of
white labourism, where a critique of exploitation was intricately linked to
racism. Hyslop locates the highpoint of this ideology in the years prior
to World War I, and elsewhere argues that across the world “the 1920s
arguably marked the onset of a period in which working-class people and
movements were increasingly nationalised”.3 This article, however, drawing
on the reaction to another deportation of white trade unionists in 1942, will
illustrate that these links and the ideology they helped generate endured
some three decades later.
present, who were ostensibly attending to keep order. Sources for this article are drawn from the
National Archives of Zambia, South Africa, Britain, and Australia along with company archives in
Ndola and London as well as private archives in Oxford and Johannesburg. The primary sources
are internal company documents, colonial and national government records, and trade-union
papers. The archives of the white mineworkers’ union have not survived, but many of the union’s
documents and communications appear in collections in other archives.
2. Jonathan Hyslop, “The Imperial Working Class Makes Itself ‘White’: White Labourism in
Britain, Australia, and South Africa Before the First World War”, Journal of Historical Sociology,
12 (1999), pp. 398–421.
3. Philip Bonner, Jonathan Hyslop, and Lucien van der Walt, “Rethinking Worlds of Labour:
Southern African Labour History in International Context”, African Studies, 66:2–3 (2007),
p. 154.
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Subsequent criticism of this concept, most recently by William Kenefick
in this journal, has focused on the conflation of white labour with
white labourism by Hyslop. This critique centres on the extent to which
“non-racialists and anti-segregationists did mount a serious challenge to the
prevailing ideology of white labourism” in South Africa through the
dissemination of radical and revolutionary ideas.4 Kenefick argues that this
questioning of white labourism was disproportionately influenced by radical
Scottish migrants. Hyslop, in turn, has replied that the challenge posed by
these radical opponents was ineffective and garnered little mass support.5 In
his article, Kenefick draws on the work of Lucien van der Walt, who has
criticized Hyslop for ignoring other currents in the white labour movement
in his original formulation of white labourism, and stresses that “the politics
of the white working class in southern Africa were not homogenous”.6
This article takes up the issues involved in these debates but approaches
them in a slightly different way. The politics of the white workforce on the
Copperbelt were certainly not homogenous as there were alternative radical
and internationalist currents which commanded significant support in the
1940s. The radicals working in the mines, however, made little attempt to
challenge the substance of white labourist ideas or the racialized segregation
of labour, and were seemingly uninterested in doing so. Their struggle was
with moderate elements within the union and with the mining companies.
Indeed, it was these radicals who, while firmly identifying the mining
companies as their primary opponent and, as will be shown later, without
resorting to an openly racist rhetoric, pressed for the introduction of a
formal industrial colour bar, alongside a closed shop andwage increases. On
the Copperbelt at least, radical and internationalist components of the white
labour movement sat within a framework of racial exclusivity, which was
tacitly accepted while the interests of white workers were defended in a
militant language.
There are, however, limitations to the applicability of the notion of white
labourism to the Copperbelt. Hyslop framed white labourism as being
partly about a claim to citizenship and rights, arguing that: “[T]here was a
strong stand of politics in which white labour activities staked their claim
to political inclusion on the basis of whiteness. Their assumption was
often that government and capital were failing to recognize them as white
4. WilliamKenefick, “ConfrontingWhite Labourism: Socialism, Syndicalism, and the Role of the
Scottish Radical Left in South Africa before 1914”, International Review of Social History,
22 (2010), pp. 29–62, 31.
5. JonathanHyslop, “Scottish Labour, Race, and Southern African Empire c.1880–1922: A Reply
to Kenefick”, International Review of Social History, 22 (2010), pp. 63–81.
6. Lucien van der Walt, “The First Globalisation and Transnational Labour Activism in Southern
Africa: White Labourism, the IWW, and the ICU, 1904–1934”, African Studies, 66:2–3 (2007),
pp. 223–251, 231–232.
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imperial subjects.”7 This dynamic was absent on the Copperbelt in this
period. White mineworkers did not, for the most part, make claims for
political inclusion or make claims for higher wages and better treatment on
the basis of their “whiteness”. Claims were made on the basis of class and on
the perceived profits of the mining companies, with the implicit assumption
that Africans were not part of this working class. This stance might thus be
best described as “passive white labourism”.
This is connected to the way in which white labourism was articulated
in this period. The kind of overt racist language used by white labour
representatives in South Africa was studiously avoided.8 Radical white
mineworkers on the Copperbelt, as will become evident in the detailed
account of events below, used the language of internationalism, trade
unionism, and class to appeal for support across the English-speaking
world, and saw no contradiction in using this language to make de facto
racialized claims on the profits of copper production. This had a lasting
impact in the postwar period, when those involved in the struggle to retain
the colour bar would strenuously avoid referring to “Europeans” or
“Africans”, and instead stress the need to avoid being “undercut” by “cheap
labour” – terms with international currency.9
Despite the considerable literature about the region, “academic investiga-
tions of the Northern Rhodesian copper mining industry”, as Ian Phimister
has noted, “have hardly looked at white miners at all”.10 Moreover, the
scattered references to white miners in this literature tend to echo the argu-
ments ofmany contemporary accounts of thewhiteworkforce, which seek to
explain, or blame, white industrial militancy on the Copperbelt on the spread
of attitudes from the South African Rand northwards.11 Such explanations
are unsatisfactory, as events on the Copperbelt in this period can be better
explained by the international movement these white mineworkers and their
7. Jonathan Hyslop, “The British and Australian Leaders of the South African Labour Movement,
1902–1914”, in Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw, and Stuart Macintyre (eds), Britishness
Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures (Carlton, VIC, 2007), pp. 90–108, 93.
8. See Hyslop, “Imperial Working Class”, pp. 409, 415 for examples.
9. See the Mufulira Mine management’s report on a meeting with the local NRMWUbranch for a
good example of this; ZCCM, 13.3.4C, Notes on a meeting with the Mufulira NRMWU branch,
25 March 1953.
10. Ian Phimister, “Workers in Wonderland? White Miners and the Northern Rhodesian
Copperbelt, 1946–1962”, South African Historical Journal, 63:2 (2011), pp. 183–233, 191.
11. The earliest example of this is Julius Lewin,The Colour Bar in the Copper Belt (Johannesburg,
1941), p. 9, but it has been a consistent theme since then. See Elena Berger, Labour, Race, and
Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence (Oxford, 1974), pp. 48–49; Charles
Perrings,BlackMineworkers inCentral Africa: Industrial Strategies and the Evolution of anAfrican
Proletariat in the Copperbelt 1911–41 (London, 1979), p. 130; Larry Butler,Copper Empire: Mining
and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, c.1930–64 (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 44, 57; and Miles
Larmer, Mineworkers in Zambia: Labour and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa (London,
2007), p. 32 for further examples.
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union – the Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers’ Union (NRMWU) – saw
themselves as part of and reached out to.
The main exception to this has been Phimister’s 2011 article, which is
specifically about the Copperbelt’s white mineworkers. However, Phimister
primarily discusses the 1950s and focuses on the lavish lifestyle of white
mineworkers, the company’s efforts to remove the industrial colour bar
(and the workers’ resistance to that), and the corporate policies of the
mining companies. In many ways, the white mineworkers’ struggle in the
1940s discussed in this article form part of the background to Phimister’s
account, as it was these struggles which secured the high wages enjoyed in
the 1950s and brought about the introduction of a colour bar. Phimister’s
analysis, however, does not devote much space to the international links of
these white mineworkers, apart from a brief section on links with mining
unions in South Africa.12
The importance of the international dimension of the labour movement in
southern Africa has been increasingly recognized.13 This article seeks to add
to this general argument, focusing on white labourers on the Copperbelt
whose politics, “as those of many other groups of white workers across the
region”, were unsurprisingly “deeply shaped by foreign models”.14 This was
perhaps even more the case on the Copperbelt as virtually none of the white
workforce had spent significant time in Northern Rhodesia before joining the
mines. The beginning of large-scale mining operations in the late 1920s
required a large amount of skilled and semiskilled labour, both of which were
in short supply in Northern Rhodesia. The mining companies were unwilling
to provide the resources to train African workers, yet the settler population of
the territory was tiny – estimated at only 5,581 in 1926 – and few of the men
there had the necessary industrial skills or experience.15 The mine manage-
ments generally took a dim view of the quality of available local white labour.
At Roan Antelope Mine, the men recruited locally were “usually wasters”,
“careless”, and across the territory “the white labour is uniformly poor”.16
LIFE AND LABOUR IN A “PREFABRICATED”
MINING COMMUNITY
With local labour not available, the companies sought to recruit and attract
white labour from mining camps across the world. Subsequent company
12. Phimister, “Workers in Wonderland?”, pp. 220–221.
13. Bonner, Hyslop, and Van der Walt, “Rethinking Worlds of Labour”, p. 139.
14. Van der Walt, “White Labourism, the IWW, and the ICU”, p. 288.
15. Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission, Report (UK Parliament, House of Commons,
Cmd. 5949) (London, 1939), p. 3.
16. Selection Trust Archives, London, G/7, Letters from J.A. Dunne, 11 September 1926 and
4November 1926. Dunne was an American mining engineer sent to the Copperbelt to oversee the
beginning of production.
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publications detailing the biographies of retiring employees give a sense of
where this labour came from. For instance, an article on twenty-four men
who retired fromMufuliraMine in July 1953, and hadmostly arrived on the
Copperbelt in the 1930s, reveals that, between them, they had worked in
England, Scotland, South Africa, Canada, the United States, New Zealand,
Southern Rhodesia, Congo, Tanganyika, and India, and tellingly does not
highlight this as something unusual.17
The white workforce these men joined was divided into two components:
a daily-paid section and a monthly-paid staff section. Staff positions
included clerical workers, administrative personnel, professionals such as
geologists and chemists, low-level managers along with supervisors of
white labour, shift bosses, mine captains, and plant foremen. The daily-paid
section encompassed almost all skilled and many semiskilled jobs on the
surface and underground. The daily-paid men were mostly either graded as
artisans – boilermakers, blacksmiths, carpenters, electricians, and fitters – or
semiskilled operators – pipefitters, riggers, cage tenders, and banksmen –
and included jobs necessary for the basic functioning of the mine such as
winding engine drivers, shaft-sinkers, and rock-breakers. Many daily-paid
men also had a supervisory role for a “gang” of African workers who
did most of the manual work. Some daily-paid workers formed a union in
1936, but it was small and ineffective until 1940. The terms of the
union recognition agreement also prohibited them from recruiting or
representing the monthly-paid mines staff, who instead formed a staff
association in 1941.
Together, the staff and daily-paid sections comprised around 11.3
per cent of the total workforce in 1941, with 2,052 daily-paid workers and
1,046 staff employed in the four Copperbelt mines.18 Significantly, this was
a higher proportion than many other mines in the region. Directly across
the border in Belgian Congo the vast opencast mines operated by Union
Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) provided a proximate and seemingly
pertinent example for both mineworkers and mine managers on the
Copperbelt. UMHK had developed a very different labour policy and
employed only 982 white mineworkers in 1941, just 5.7 per cent of the total
workforce, with African workers undertaking jobs done by Europeans on
the Copperbelt for a fraction of the wages.19 However, in both the Katanga
and Copperbelt mines it was African mineworkers who carried out the
overwhelming majority of manual work underground and on the surface:
working as labourers, drillers, preparing blasting, carrying tools, removing
17. “Twenty-four Old-Timers Say Goodbye”, Mufulira Magazine, July 1953. The same issue
notes that five people had resigned fromMufuliraMine that month alone to move to Canada. This
magazine does not, to my knowledge, survive in any repository but a copy is in my possession.
18. Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Yearbook 1956 (Kitwe, 1957), p. 68.
19. Perrings, Black Mineworkers in Central Africa, p. 252.
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blasted ore, lashing, operating grizzlies,20 carrying outminor repairs, etc. There
were also higher-status jobs which involved lessmanual labour including “boss
boys”, who supervised African labour, or lower-level clerk jobs.
The cleavage in the workforce was replicated in the Copperbelt towns as
housing was segregated between European and African workers.21 The
towns were actually split into four unequal parts: the European and African
townships were themselves divided into a mine township and a government
township. European mineworkers and their dependents dominated the
European townships, which were entirely separate from the African
townships. Among a total white population of 8,574 in the Copperbelt
towns in 1946, 3,246 (38 per cent) of them were directly employed by the
mines.22 In turn, their numbers were dwarfed by the African townships.
The townships were alike in name only. From the mid-1930s, thousands
of small, high-density mud-brick and concrete huts were constructed to
house an African workforce which numbered over 27,000 by 1941, plus
tens of thousands of women and children, along with a smaller number of
three-bedroomed houses for senior married African workers built in the
1940s.23 Mine housing for white employees had rapidly improved during
the 1930s from corrugated iron huts and hostels to well-appointed bungalows
with gardens, though the increase in thewhite workforce duringWorldWar II
generated some problems with overcrowding.
All mining housing was, however, grouped closely around the mines so the
plants and shafts were within walking distance. The mining townships also
remained the private property of themining companies. LewisGann recognized
this as being modelled on the “American system of ‘company towns’”, where
people could not live without permission of the management.24 This similarity
to American company towns is perhaps unsurprising, given that it was
American capital, Americanmining companies, andAmericanmining engineers
that played a major role in the initial development of the Copperbelt.25
20. A grizzly was: “[a] sizing device consisting of two or more parallel steel bars over which
broken rock is passed by gravity to trap oversize pieces which are reduced by hammers or
explosives”. See “Glossary”, Zambia’s Mining Industry: The First 50 years (Ndola, 1978), p. 78.
21. “European” and “white” are used synonymously in this article. I am conscious that this
equation may be problematic, particularly as some of these “white” workers had, in fact, never
even been to Europe. However, I am following the way these terms are used in the original sources
as workers at the time referred to themselves both as “white” and “European”.
22. Berger, Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule, p. 16.
23. Robert Home, “From Barrack Compounds to the Single Family House: Planning Worker
Housing in Colonial Natal andNorthern Rhodesia”, Planning Perspectives, 15 (2000), pp. 327–347,
330, 340; George Chauncey, Jr, “The Locus of Reproduction: Women's Labour in the Zambian
Copperbelt, 1927–1953”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 7:2 (1981), pp. 135–164, 138.
24. L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953 (London, 1964), p. 210.
25. Andrew Roberts, “Notes towards a Financial History of Copper Mining in Northern
Rhodesia”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 16 (1982), pp. 347–359, 348.
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Following the discovery of commercially viable copper deposits in the early
1920s, the Copperbelt was rapidly divided up by two mining companies: the
Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) and Rhodesian Anglo American (RAA). By
1930, other would-be competitors had been bought up or squeezed out, a
dominant position which would remain unaltered until the late 1960s.26 RST
was based in London but was primarily staffed and financed by Americans
and operated Roan Antelope and Mufulira mines while RAA was a sub-
sidiary of Anglo American, a South African mining conglomerate, operating
Nkana and Nchanga mines.27
These companies had an international outlook and consciously modelled
wages, working conditions andworking practices for theCopperbelt mines on
mining regions elsewhere in theworld.Whiteminers andmanagers arriving on
the Copperbelt could slot themselves into what were, in many ways, very
familiar circumstances.28 The mining camps on the Copperbelt can be com-
pared to “prefabricated communities”, a notion coined by James Belich for the
crew culture ofNewZealand,which he explains as being like: “a new school or
a new sports team. The place and people are different, but they duplicate your
previous experience; teachers and coaches, desks and balls, curricula and game
plans, formal positions and rules, informal customs and folklore.”29
Along with their industrial skills, these men brought with them ideas and
traditions from the international labour movement, and retained links with the
regions they had come from. However, the first efforts to form unions among
the daily-paid workers from the early 1930s were abortive, primarily because
the workforce was highly transient. There was an attempt to form an Industrial
Workers’ Federation in 1934, followed by failed efforts to establish a South
African Mine Workers’ Union (SAMWU) branch – scuppered when eagle-
eyed RST board members spotted that the SAMWU constitution prohibited
external branches – before the NRMWU was founded in October 1936.30
26. Butler, Copper Empire, p. 17.
27. Confusingly, RAA operated Nkana Mine through another subsidiary, the Rhokana
Corporation, in which RAAheld a majority stake and which remained firmly under the control of
Anglo American. See B.W.E. Alford and C.E. Harvey, “The Formation of the Rhokana
Corporation, 1930–32”, The Business History Review, 54 (1980), pp. 330–358.
28. See ZCCM, 16.2.4B, Telegram from General Manager, Roan Antelope to Selection Trust
London, 3 July 1930, for working conditions being set with reference to the Cumberland coal-
fields, and ZCCM, 3.8.2A, Letter from F.A. Unger to Manager, Anglo American Johannesburg,
11 April 1940, for how the Rand was similarly used as a reference point. Unger was the Technical
Director of Anglo American.
29. James Belich, Making Peoples: A History of New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to
the End of the Nineteenth Century (Auckland, 1996), p. 428.
30. See the following letters between management and union representatives: Zambia National
Archives, Lusaka [hereafter, ZNA], SEC1/1376, Letter from Frank Ayer to Charles Harris,
7 October 1936; Letter from Ben Rount to Chief Secretary, 25 October 1936. Ben Rount was the
first NRMWUGeneral Secretary and was killed by silicosis in 1939. The Chief Secretary was the
senior civil servant in the Northern Rhodesia Government.
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The recognition agreement the NRMWU signed with mine manage-
ments was restrictive and left the union unable to pursue its demands
effectively.31 This weakness aggravated internal feuds, and the union went
through four general secretaries in three years. The most damaging row came
Figure 1. Original constitution of the NRMWU, 1936.
Zambia National Archives, Lusaka, SEC1/1376, Constitution of the Northern Rhodesian Mine
Workers’ Union, 1936.
31. ZNA,MM1/10/2, Agreement signed on 20 September 1937with RoanAntelope CopperMines.
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in August 1939 when the union split following a dispute over union finances
and the failure to get a sacked American miner reinstated at Roan Antelope.
The Roan branch, the largest in the union, left and formed the rival Roan
Mine Workers’ Federation. At the onset of World War II, the union was
bitterly divided, heavily indebted and its survival was in doubt.32
This position was dramatically altered by the war. The Copperbelt was the
only major supply of copper within the British Empire and so it became
absolutely crucial for the British war effort, with Raymond Dumett arguing
that “it is unlikely that the British could have stayed in the war” without
supplies from Northern Rhodesia and South Africa.33 The Ministry of
Supply bought the entire Copperbelt output – which peaked at 247,000 long
tons in the critical year of 1942 – at a fixed price, and by 1945 Northern
Rhodesia was supplying nearly 68 per cent of Britain’s copper supplies.34
This placed the white mineworkers in a strong position, provided that they
were willing to disrupt the war effort. The war also altered the situation
in another sense. On 6 September 1939, the colonial administration issued
new emergency regulations prohibiting all male British subjects working in
the mining industry from leaving Northern Rhodesia without a permit,
which was very difficult to obtain.35 Men unhappy with conditions on the
Copperbelt could not leave. Theywere now stuck for the duration of the war.
WILDCAT STRIKES IN MARCH 1940
In early 1940, a network of militants among the white workforce decided to
utilize the opportunity presented by the war to settle longstanding grievances
over wages and working conditions and to improve their bargaining position
permanently. General disaffection with the union allowed this informal
group to circumvent the official leadership, push them aside and transform
the situation by reinvigorating the union. In February 1939, for instance,
an NRMWU branch meeting in Nkana was informed that only 23 per cent
of the 689-strong daily-paid workforce on the mine was in the union.36
ByMay 1941, membership had risen to around 80 per cent at Nkana, and the
situation in other mines was similar.37
32. Berger, Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule, p. 58.
33. Raymond Dumett, “Africa’s Strategic Minerals during the Second World War”, Journal of
African History, 26 (1985), pp. 381–408, 393. Britain also had access to significant copper supplies
from mines in Katanga after Germany occupied Belgium.
34. Butler, Copper Empire, p. 61.
35. The National Archives, London [hereafter, TNA], CO 795/118/15, Despatch fromGovernor’s
Deputy to Colonial Secretary, 6 March 1940.
36. ZNA, SEC1/1376, Letter from Provincial Commissioner, Ndola to Chief Secretary, 4 March
1939. The Provincial Commissioner was the senior civil servant on the Copperbelt.
37. TNA, CO 795/122/14, Telegram from Officer Administering Government to Colonial
Secretary, 16 May 1941.
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The weakness of the union leadership and its lack of control over the
daily-paid workforce were evident from the outset of the dispute which
started in March 1940. On 15 March, a mass meeting at Mufulira shouted
down the local union-branch chairman and formed a committee of action in
its place.38 Disavowing the recognition agreement – which stipulated that
negotiations and conciliation had to take place before a strike – the meeting
placed a list of demands before the Mufulira management and announced
that a strike would take place within twenty-four hours if they were not
met. The committee of action gave a blunt statement to the mine manager
Robert Peterson: they were not prepared to negotiate and instead promised
“direct action”, as this was “the only action which will bring immediate
and certain results”.39 Therefore, at 7 am on 17 March, European miners
gathered around the shaft at Mufulira and voted by a show of hands to
begin the strike. Tellingly, this occurred only two days after the union
President, Tom Ross, had left the Copperbelt on leave and while the General
Secretary Victor Welsford was out of the territory.40
One of themain instigators atMufulirawas FrankMaybank, an underground
timberman. Maybank had been born in Britain but emigrated as a young
man and spent around fifteen years working as a miner in New Zealand and
Australia. His experiences in the Australian labour movement and involvement
in radical politics there – he had been a member of the Communist Party of
Australia (CPA) and a branch chair of the AustralianWorkers’Union (AWU) –
left a deep impression on him.41 By the time he arrived on the Copperbelt in
1939 he had been involved in strikes in both Australia and New Zealand and
spent time in the Soviet Union as a guest of theGeneralMineworkers’Union.42
38. See the following message by General Manager of Roan Antelope, who had overall respon-
sibility for Mufulira Mine, to the London headquarters: ZCCM, 3.8.1A, Telegram from Frank
Ayer to Selection Trust, London, 18 March 1940.
39. ZNA, SEC/1383, Letter from Governor JohnMaybin to MalcolmMacDonald, 2 April 1940.
John Maybin was Governor of Northern Rhodesia from 1938 to 1941. He included a copy of the
statement issued by the Mufulira Committee of Action in this letter.
40. See the following letter from Alfred Royden Harrison, General Manager at Nkana Mine:
ZCCM, 3.8.1A, Letter from A. Royden Harrison to Manager, Anglo American Johannesburg,
30March 1940; and ZCCM, 15.1.6E,Notes on interviewwith J. Purvis, March 18 1940. The notes
are from W.J. MacKenzie, mine superintendant at Roan Antelope and originally from British
Columbia, who requested a meeting with Jim Purvis, an electrician at Roan Antelope from
Australia, after the strike began at Mufulira to discuss the mood at Roan Antelope. Purvis obliged
and utilized the opportunity to criticize heavily the official NRMWU leadership, whom Purvis
assumed had orchestrated the dispute and whom he despised as they had expelled him from the
NRMWU in August 1939. This had precipitated the split in the union and the formation of the
separate Roan Mineworkers’ Federation. Purvis was apparently surprised to learn that the official
NRMWU leadership were not in charge, and some were not even on the Copperbelt.
41. “Leonora-Gwalia”, Kalgoorlie Miner, 12 February 1934.
42. “A Perth Man’s Impressions of Russia”, Perth Sunday Times, 7 July 1935; personal papers of
Frank Maybank, in author’s possession.
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“Ain’t I a bastard?”, he said years afterwards to settler politician Roy
Welensky, “Well, I received my training in Aussie you know.”43 Following
the strikes he became General Secretary of the NRMWU union. Maybank
himself does not seem to have had any personal animosity towards Africans
or held particularly racist views, but at the same time he clearly identified his
own constituency as skilled white workers and was largely uninterested in
developments among the African workforce. In 1940 at least, he accepted
that the NRMWU should be a whites-only union and supported militant
action to secure an industrial colour bar.44
Two days after the walkout at Mufulira, a similar meeting was called at
Nkana mine. Around 700 people gathered to hear Brian Goodwin, a South
African rock-breaker, reading through a long list of grievances and claiming
that the management had refused to consider them at all. Following this, he
announced: “Under an agreement which was made in our youth we first
have to go to conciliation or to arbitration and it may be months and
months before we get anywhere. I shall now close the meeting on behalf of
the MineWorkers’Union.”Whereupon, another miner leapt onto the table
in front of Goodwin and asked: “Are we to take this lying down or are we
going to take action?”45 The meeeting voted to suspend the formal nego-
tiating machinery and instead elected a committee of action, with Goodwin
at its head, and adopted the demands of the Mufulira dispute. Urged on by
strikers from Mufulira and former local Legislative Council member
Catherine Olds46 – who declared that miners should not be disuaded from
striking by their wives or children – the meeting voted to deliver an even
sharper ultimatuum to mine management: to agree to their demands within
twelve hours or face strike action. Both the meetings at Nkana andMufulira
felt able to issue such blunt threats as they were not simply gatherings of
43. Welensky Papers, Oxford, 644/10, Letter from FrankMaybank to RoyWelensky, 27 January
1957. Roy Welensky (who by 1957 had become a leading political figure among the European
settlers in the region) was a trade unionist working on the railways in 1940. The Welensky Papers
are a voluminous collection of his personal correspondence and official papers from the political
offices he held.
44. Maybank’s view that he was primarily a member and a representative of the white workforce
can be seen in his contributions to the Forster Commission (whichwas held to investigate the 1940
strikes); TNA, CO 795/117/2, Forster Commission, 29 May 1940.
45. ZCCM, 3.8.1A, Notes of meeting of mineworkers held in Cinema Hall, Nkana on Tuesday,
19 March 1940. The notes appear to have been compiled by a management informant.
46. The Legislative Council was the legislature governing some aspects of Northern Rhodesia,
though the Governor had a veto over legislation and much power continued to reside in the
Colonial Office. The body was partly appointed by the Governor and partly elected by white
voters. Catherine Olds, whose husband was a miner, was elected to represent Nkana in 1935 but
stood down in 1938. Following this dispute, a Northern Rhodesia Labour Party was formed and
won five of the eight elected seats in 1941, including all three Copperbelt seats. For more details
on the Legislative Council see J.W. Davidson, The Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council
(London, 1948).
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union members but were effectively a mobilization of the European com-
munity in the mining towns protesting about the rising cost of living. At the
Nkana mine, for instance, management informants estimated that around
200 women attended the meeting alongside male mineworkers, and they
appear to have voted on the list of demands as well.47
Daily-paid workers were caught in an ambiguous place in the mines.
Strategically, they appeared to be in a strong position. As they were to
demonstrate repeatedly in the 1940s and 1950s, the mines simply could not
function without winding-engine drivers hauling people and ore up the
shafts, rock-breakers opening new stopes, artisans repairing machinery, or
power-plant operators keeping the lights on. The skills daily-paid mine-
workers had and the jobs they did ensured they occupied a crucial position
in the process of production. Yet, they also felt highly vulnerable.
Daily-paid men could be dismissed with twenty-four hours’ notice, at
which point they would also lose their houses and have to travel hundreds
of miles to find comparable industrial work, and they received no sick pay
when they could not work due to illness. In addition to this dependency on
Figure 2. Frank Maybank, Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers’ Union General Secretary, c.1945.
Personal papers of Frank Maybank, in author’s possession.
47. ZCCM, 3.8.1A, Notes of meeting of mineworkers held in Cinema Hall, Nkana on Tuesday,
19 March 1940.
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the mining companies, daily-paid mineworkers also feared that they were
liable to displacement from below by African workers. Similar to the white
mineworkers on the South African Rand that Jeremy Krikler and Frederick
Johnstone have analysed, daily-paid mineworkers appeared to be in a
precarious structural position, with the presence of a much larger African
workforce which could be employed on much lower wages weighing
heavily on their minds.48 Their fears were not completely unfounded: the
introduction of a pension and bonus scheme for European workers in 1937
had resulted in a sharp increase in labour costs and, consequently, the
mining companies were anxious to reduce costs by training Africans to do
tasks previously undertaken by Europeans.49
Partly because European labour costs were already rising, the head
offices of RST and RAA in London had resolved to reject virtually all the
demands.50 Moreover, the managers on the Copperbelt would initially not
even consider meeting representatives of the committees or the union.51
Therefore, on 21 March, a large number of men from Mufulira joined
mineworkers from Nkana and picketed all shafts and workshops on the
property, shutting the mine.52 The power of the informal action committees
to make good their threats was now evident. At Mufulira, it appears that not
a single member of the daily-paid workforce worked during the strike,
while at Nkana the police reported that only two Europeans went under-
ground to work on the first day of the strike.53
Significantly, the strike now affected mines owned by both mining
groups and the action committees were insistent that their grievances and
demands covered the whole Copperbelt, not only the mines on strike.
Meetings at Nchanga and Roan Antelope also backed the fairly extensive
list of demands, which included action on wages, the closed shop, housing,
a more favourable negotiating procedure, and silicosis.54 The latter was
passionately upheld by all white mineworkers in the region, silicosis
48. Jeremy Krikler, White Rising: The 1922 Insurrection and Racial Killing in South Africa
(Manchester, 2005), pp. 30–32; Frederick Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold: A Study of Class
Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa (London, 1976), pp. 50–75.
49. Butler, Copper Empire, p. 58.
50. See the following telegram from Arthur Storke, an American mining engineer and RST
managing director: ZCCM, 3.8.1A, Telegram from Storke, Selection Trust London to F. Ayer,
19 March 1940. This telegram also notes that Anglo American were in complete agreement on
this point.
51. ZNA, SEC1/1382, European Strike: Report on Mediation Attempt by T.S. Sandford,
26 March 1940.
52. ZCCM, 3.8.1A, Letter from Royden Harrison to Manager, Anglo American Johannesburg,
30 March 1940.
53. ZNA, SEC/1383, Extract from the Commissioner of Police’s Diary, 21 March 1940.
54. ZNA, SEC1/1382,Workers’Demands fromMineManagement (undated). This is the original
list of demands drawn up by the action committees.
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prevention having already been raised by white mineworkers’ unions in
South Africa in the 1900s and 1910s.55 Demands effectively putting in place
a colour bar by calling for the organization of work to be fixed along
existing racial lines were added in the negotiations after the strike, and
notably were supported by all prominent figures in the dispute including
Maybank, Hodgson, and Goodwin.
Significantly, these demands were formulated with explicit reference to
wages and working conditions in other mining and industrial centres in the
British Empire and the United States – with particular praise reserved for
BrokenHill in Australia – along with the perceived gains made in the Soviet
Union.56 Conditions in such disparate locations were relevant, as mine-
workers on the Copperbelt saw themselves and the workers in these places
as part of the same class and labour movement, a view that, to a certain
extent, was reciprocated when theNRMWU started to rally the international
labour movement in support of its demands. A flurry of telegrams to
Labour MPs in Britain as well as to British and South African trade unions
accompanied the 1940 strikes and subsequent disputes.57 Through the
British trade-union movement, the NRMWU built links with left-wingers
in the Labour Party and the Independent Labour Party who then lobbied
the British government in support of them.
Yet it was not only the white mineworkers whose thinking and demands
were informed by their international links. The mine management, too, had
been recruited from mining centres around the world. In particular, RST’s
management structure had practically been imported wholesale from the
United States, perhaps unsurprising as the company’s chairman Alfred
Chester Beatty had enjoyed an extraordinarily successful career as a mining
engineer in the US.58 The General Manager of Roan Antelope, Frank
Ayer, had been recruited directly from Phelps Dodge’s Morenci Mine in
Arizona, while his subordinate at Mufulira, Peterson, was also an American
55. Elaine Katz, The White Death: Silicosis on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, 1886–1910
(Johannesburg, 1994).
56. See ZCCM, 15.1.6E, Notes on a meeting held at the Luanshya Hotel on 22 March 1940,
where a debate took place on working conditions elsewhere. See ZNA, SEC1/1758, Roan
Mineworkers’ Review, Christmas 1941 for an article praising the Soviet Union as the example to
be emulated as it was “the only [government] who puts the needs of the people before the profits
of a few”. The Roan Mineworkers’ Review was a regular publication of the NRMWU Roan
Antelope branch. The Roan Mineworkers’ Federation re-joined the NRMWU in March 1941.
57. See ZCCM, 3.8.1A, Notes of meeting of mineworkers held in Cinema Hall, Nkana on
Tuesday, 19 March 1940 for the announcement that telegrams had been sent to Clement Atlee and
other Labour MPs; and Telegram from NRMWU, Mufulira to Arthur Storke, 2 September 1940
for telegrams sent during a subsequent dispute.
58. John Phillips, “AlfredChester Beatty:Mining Engineer, Financier, and Entrepreneur, 1898–1950”,
in Raymond Dumett (ed.), Mining Tycoons in the Age of Empire, 1870–1945: Entrepreneurship,
High Finance, Politics and Territorial Expansion (Farnham, 2009), pp. 215–238, 217–223.
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mining engineer.59 Copper companies had fought hard and successfully to
keep trade unions out of the mines and smelters in the American West,
including in Arizona, and Ayer’s experience there had taught him that
unions were dangerous and always acted to undermine the authority of mine
management.60 The 1940 strike did little tomodify this attitude, and following
the dispute Ayer bluntly informed a local colonial official that “he was
opposed to Unions anywhere”.61
Ayer drew on his own experience of working conditions elsewhere in the
world to contest the claims of the NRMWU.He rejected a claim that smelter
conditions at Mufulira were so bad that they required a special allowance by
getting men at Mufulira who had worked at smelters in Douglas (Arizona)
and the Anaconda smelter in Butte (Montana) to vouch for the allegedly
better conditions on the Copperbelt.62 Other managers adopted a similar
approach – disputing wage claims with reference to wages and working
conditions on the Kent coalfields, for instance –63 but Ayer found that his
hard-line attitude had left him isolated. Ayer’s tactics had failed during the
strike and other managers had to pressure him into negotiating. Only a few
months after the strike, RST directors transferred Ayer from Roan Antelope,
his removal having become a key demand of the union.64
Notably, this demand and the general hostility towards American
managers was itself informed by theNRMWU’s awareness of the international
links of mine management, and its knowledge of developments in American
mining regions. The union knew that “Mine Managements operating in
NorthernRhodesia are largely influenced byAmerican training and ideology”,
and, in particular, believed that Ayer’s ideas for employee committees in the
mines represented an existential threat as “the history of such concerns in the
USA” showed that they were “capable of destroying completely the spirit and
principles of the NRMWU”.65
Ironically, given that this dispute helped cement racially exclusive
working practices, the position of white workers was reinforced by the fact
that their dispute precipitated a larger and more serious strike by African
59. “CompanyMeetings”, The Times, 21 November 1933. Phelps Dodge had an indirect interest
in RST through its holdings in the American Metal Company; see Roberts, “Financial History of
Copper Mining”, p. 348.
60. Charles Hyde, Copper for America: The United States Copper Industry from Colonial Times
to the 1990s (Tucson, AZ, 1998), pp. 86, 149–159.
61. ZNA, SEC1/1420, Letter from Provincial Commissioner, Ndola to Chief Secretary,
25 September 1940.
62. Ibid., Letter from Frank Ayer to Chief Secretary, 9 September 1940.
63. ZCCM, 3.8.2A, Comparison between wages and conditions of employment in a large coal
mine in Kent and the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia, 5 June 1940.
64. ZNA, SEC1/1420, Letter from Provincial Commissioner, Ndola to Chief Secretary,
7 September 1940.
65. ZNA, SEC1/1389, NRMWU Bulletin No. 2, February 1939.
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mineworkers. A day after whitemineworkers returned towork on 27March,
African mineworkers came out on strike at Nkana Mine and then at
Mufulira. This dispute culminated in a protest at Nkana where seventeen
strikers were killed and around sixty-five injured after soldiers opened fire
on the crowd when some strikers pelted them with stones.66 Significantly,
the strike was confined to the mines where white mineworkers had walked
out, even though the low pay for African mineworkers and harsh condi-
tions in which they worked were similar at all four mines. For its part, mine
management was convinced that the white workforce had either inspired or
directly orchestrated the African dispute.
There appears to have been some truth in this fear. Among individual white
mineworkers it appears that some did take the initiative to encourage African
mineworkers to strike, and since many white mineworkers supervised
groups of African mineworkers they had ample opportunity to do so. At the
Forster Commission, established to investigate the 1940 strikes, Changa
Mwinangumbo, an underground miner at Nkana, claimed that white miners
returning to work openly questioned why African miners had come to
work after the strike, and said that they would get more money if they
stayed away.67 Yaphet Gerusi, a shaft clerk and member of the committee
representing African strikers at Nkana, also claimed that European miners
had advised them to strike.68 Other African mineworkers pointed to the
example of the successful European strike, rather than direct encouragement,
as the trigger for the African dispute.69 Regardless of the precise contribution
white mineworkers may have made to this strike, it added to the pressure on
mine management. Faced with the prospect of continuing industrial chaos,
the mine management eventually caved in and agreed to most of the
NRMWU’s demands. A new recognition agreement to this effect was signed
in July 1940, although the demand for a closed shopwas resisted until 1941.70
This agreement did not satisfy either side. The companies considered that
the agreement had been forced on them and remained unreconciled to it,
particularly as their acquiescence had not bought industrial peace. Russell
Parker, an American mining engineer and assistant to the chairman of RST,
Chester Beatty, admitted frankly that he “sometimes felt that in face of
this continuously increasing demand he would like to tell the Union to go
66. Ian Henderson, “Early African Leadership: The Copperbelt Disturbances of 1935 and 1940”,
Journal of Southern African Studies, 2 (1975), pp. 83–97, 92.
67. TNA, CO 795/117/2, Testimony from Changa Mwinangumbo, 23 May 1940.
68. Ibid., Testimony of Yaphet Gerusi, 24 May 1940. In another illustration of the contradictory
attitudes on the mines, Gerusi also complained in his testimony that European miners regularly
insulted Africans.
69. Ibid., Testimony of Edward Sampa, 23 May 1940. Sampa was a bricklayer at Nkana and had
worked there for ten years.
70. ZNA, SEC1/1399, Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers’ Union Agreement.
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to hell”.71 The NRMWU, for their part, pressed their advantage, and the
1940 strikes were the first in a series of efforts by the union to wrest control
over the functioning of the mines and the mining towns where manage-
ment’s writ held sway. Disputes followed, in the course of which the union
won partial control over the mine recreation clubs, as well as an increased
say in the allocation of mine housing, and got copper production committees
established, which involved shop stewards in the day-to-day running of
the mines.72 The NRMWU grew progressively more ambitious, and any
grievance, theywarned, had to be settled immediately, “for if they are allowed
to go without settlement for the duration [of the war], they can only be
settled by revolution”, of the kind that had occurred in Russia.73
INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN KATANGA
The labour policies of UMHK in Belgian Congo offered white mineworkers
on the Copperbelt – many of whom had previously worked in Katanga – a
vision of the future if the mining companies were given a free rein. Twomajor
strikes bywhite workers in Katanga afterWorldWar I had convincedUMHK
of the importance of retaining tight control over their white workforce and
replacing themwith African workers. In April 1922, theUMHKboard noted,
“our officials in Africa are convinced of the necessity of employing native
labour to the largest extent possible in substitution for white labour”.74 The
use of opencast mining – possible as there were rich ore deposits nearer the
surface in Katanga – rather than underground mining facilitated this process,
but UMHK also made a concerted effort to train African workers to replace
Europeans in surface jobs and in their underground operations. By 1941,
there were reportedly only 38 Europeans working underground at Prince
Leopold Mine, located only a few hundred yards from the border with
Northern Rhodesia, and around 1,100 Africans.75 This allowed UMHK to
reduce its total wage bill steadily in the interwar period.
The implementation of the colour bar on the Copperbelt in 1941 revealed
that a similar but more gradual process was also underway there. It had not
71. Parker made these comments during a meeting with Colonial Office civil servants; see TNA,
CO 795/122/14, Notes of a meeting held in Mr Hall’s room, 20 May 1941.
72. See ZCCM, 12.4.8F, Telegram from Anglo American Johannesburg to Rhokana London,
6March 1942 for the campaign over mine recreation clubs. See the letter from the GeneralManager of
NchangaMine to a local civil servant for details of the dispute over mine housing; ZNA, SEC1/1422,
Letter from W.A. Pope to District Commissioner, Chingola, 27 August 1942. Details of how the
copper production committees were formed and functioned are available in theminutes of committees
on all four mines; see ZNA, SEC1/1620, Copper Production Committee Copperbelt, 1942–1948.
73. ZNA, SEC1/1758, Roan Mineworkers’ Review, Christmas 1941.
74. Quoted from Perrings, Black Mineworkers in Central Africa, p. 54 [emphasis in original].
75. ZNA, SEC1/1341, Report on Visit to the Congo, 7 October 1941. This report was compiled
by the labour officer of the colonial administration.
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been possible to impose a uniform colour bar across all four mines because of
what came to be known as “ragged edge” jobs. These twenty-seven jobs were
tasks done by Europeans in some mines – and according to the colour bar
could only be performed by Europeans in these mines – but were done by
Africans in other mines, and included bricklaying, operating smaller winding
engines, and driving locomotives.76 “Ragged edge” jobs formed only part of
the tasks undertaken by European mineworkers, and pointed to an ongoing
process of job fragmentation: mine management did not think it was realistic,
in most cases, to replace European mineworkers directly, and instead sought
to break down European-held jobs into smaller tasks for which it would be
easier to instruct African mineworkers. Fragmentation was possible as many
of jobs performed by Europeans involved several discrete tasks that could be
separated into smaller, less skilled jobs, such as artisans performing both
routine and complex repairs on machinery. By 1939, Nkana Mine manage-
ment had decided that Africans could perform certain tasks as well as
Europeans, so more work should be done by them.77 It is probably not a
coincidence that one of the few cases of outright displacement subsequently
took place at Nkana mine: in April 1941, three European screen operators in
the mill (who worked the screen preventing larger rocks from entering the
milling process) were replaced by three Africans, justified on the grounds that
the mill was no longer operating at full production.78 The ensuing furore and
threats of further strike action finally compelled the mine management to
accept a colour bar and closed shop in August 1941.79
Wartime developments had generated great pressure towards a
formal colour bar, partly because it brought the Katanga mines and their
composition of labour “closer” to the Copperbelt, thus increasing anxiety
among Europeans there. After the fall of Belgium in May 1940 the British
Government began purchasing the entire copper output of the Katanga
mines.80 Representatives of the NRMWU explained to trade unions else-
where in the world the obvious danger this represented to the Copperbelt:
As the British tax-payer was paying for all copper production in both territories it
would not be long before somebody would want to know why our wages
were much higher for the same work as they were in the Belgian Congo […].
76. Berger, Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule, Appendix A.
77. Henry Meebelo, African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism: The Origins, Growth, and
Struggles of the Zambian Labour Movement to 1964 (Lusaka, 1986), p. 108.
78. TNA, CO 795/122/14, Telegram from Peterson, Luanshya to Selection Trust London,
25 April 1941. The companies attempted to pressure the British Government to prohibit the
closed shop and the colour bar so some internal company correspondence is included among
government papers.
79. Ibid., Notice to Employees, Northern Rhodesian Copper Mining Companies, 21 August
1941.
80. Bruce Fetter, “If I Had Known That 35 Years Ago: Contextualizing the Copper Mines of
Central Africa”, History in Africa, 26 (1999), pp. 449–452, 451–452.
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Naturally the NRMWU were forced to take a very keen interest in the standards
of the Congo.81
In August 1941, white miners in Katanga appealed to the NRMWU for
assistance in forming a union. UMHK’s predominately Belgian white
workforce were contractually forbidden to join a union, so this was done in
secret when several hundred men met clandestinely in the forest near the
border to establish the Association des Agents de l’UnionMinière et Filiales
(AGUFI).82 This was a development that UMHK would not tolerate, and
following a strike in June 1942, the union’s leadership was arrested and
imprisoned for “defeatist talk”.83 This provoked further strikes in August
and, in response, the union leadership was deported and spent the rest of the
war in preventative detention, events which foreshadowed what was about
to happen on the Copperbelt.84
The NRMWU were already closely entangled in these events. Three
miners from the Copperbelt were arrested by Belgian police at a nocturnal
meeting in Lubumbashi on the eve of a strike in August – they implausibly
claimed they were on holiday – and the union was considering launching
sympathy strikes in support of Belgianminers.85On theNorthernRhodesian
side of the border, the ground was being prepared with leaflets denouncing
the Congo administration, drawn up by a Belgian miner at Nchanga Mine
who had been deported from Belgian Congo, and distributed across the
Copperbelt by the NRMWU.86 The union was also reaching out inter-
nationally and, in the UK, the Communist MPWillie Gallacher responded to
a telegram from the NRMWU by pressing the Colonial Secretary to remove
any obstacles put in the way of the recognition of AGUFI.87
Further strikes in Jadotville in September prompted an even more deter-
mined response from UMHK. From the beginning of the strike a “virtual
state of siege was declared in Jadotville”, according to the British Consul in
Elisabethville, with roads out of the town closed, public meetings forbidden,
and a curfew imposed, all enforced by African soldiers and police.88
81. Historical Papers Archive, Johannesburg [hereafter, HPA], AH 646 Dc12.20, Memorandum
submitted on behalf of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers’ Union by Mr J. Purvis.
82. Ibid.
83. See the following letter from the British Consul in Elisabethville (Congo) to a British official
in Leopoldville (Congo): TNA, CO 795/123/7, Letter from T.R. Shaw to F.M. Shepherd,
11 August 1942.
84. John Higginson, A Working Class in the Making: Belgian Colonial Labor Policy, Private
Enterprise, and the African Mineworkers, 1907–1951 (Madison, WI, 1989), pp. 188, 194.
85. TNA, CO 795/123/7, Letter from T.R. Shaw to F.M. Shepherd, 11 August 1942.
86. TNA, CO 795/122/13, Letter from Governor Waddington to Oliver Stanley, 11 December
1942. Oliver Stanley was Colonial Secretary fromNovember 1942 to July 1945; JohnWaddington
was Governor of Northern Rhodesia from 1941–1947.
87. TNA, CO 795/123/7, Letter from William Gallacher to Colonial Secretary, 5 August 1942.
88. TNA, CO 795/123/7, Letter from T.R. Shaw to F.M. Shepherd, 28 September 1942.
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This provoked desperate appeals for help across the border. Delegates from
the Copperbelt had met representatives of the UMHK workforce in secret
inside Katanga on 2 August and pledged unqualified support for AGUFI;
now they began to attempt to fulfil this promise.
That this would mean disrupting wartime copper production did not faze
some union members. NRMWU president Pat Murray acknowledged
that copper production was important, but warned Clement Atlee: “We say,
‘that international trades’ unionism is of equal importance’.”89 Telegrams
were immediately despatched to other MPs in Britain, urging them to lobby
for the release of the Katanga union’s leadership and, for good measure,
that prevailing working conditions and wage rates on the Copperbelt
be extended to Katanga.90 At the same time, preparations began for
industrial action on the Copperbelt, and Maybank telegraphed the
Rhodesian Railway Workers’ Union (RRWU) to suggest joint action:
“Congo strike in progress. Black troops used against white population.
Evidence of no shooting yet. Feeling rising here request you wire Belgian
Government insist on democratic rights of European workers, also indicate
if necessary railway employees will refuse to handle Congo passengers and
goods.”91
The RRWU were unwilling to act, but the Northern Rhodesian
Government took this as a blatant threat to disrupt the war effort. The
Governor, Sir John Waddington, felt the situation was slipping out of his
control, and with “extremists on both sides of the border […] in close
contact”, he pleaded for troops to be deployed as there were fears the
territory would see an armed uprising like the Rand Revolt.92 The crucial
importance of the Copperbelt to Britain’s war effort ensured that this threat
89. TNA, CO 795/123/7, Letter from F.E.J.P. Murray to Clement Atlee, 18 August 1942.
Murray, a general miner, was identified as a communist by the colonial administration and did not
deny the allegation; see TNA, CO 795/122/13, Letter from Governor Waddington to Oliver
Stanley, 11 December 1942. The same source claims that Murray did not fear competition from
African workers because of his perception of his own skill as a miner.
90. HPA, AH 646 Dc12.20, Memorandum submitted on behalf of the Northern Rhodesia Mine
Workers’ Union by Mr J. Purvis. This document was put together by Jim Purvis to give an
overview of the dispute in Katanga, the arrests of Maybank and Meyer, and as an appeal for
solidarity.
91. Quoted in National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria [hereafter, NASA], ARB 119/5 1193,
Meeting between His Excellency the Governor and the General Council of the Mine Workers’
Union. This is a copy of an address Governor Waddington made to the NRMWU General
Council on 27 November 1942, during which he quoted from telegrams sent by Maybank which
had been intercepted by the colonial administration.
92. TNA, PREM4/43A/4, Telegram fromGovernorWaddington toColonial Secretary, 6 September
1942 and 11 September 1942. The Rand Revolt was an armed uprising by white mineworkers in
Johannesburg in 1922 which had escalated from a strike. See Krikler, White Rising for a detailed
account of the revolt. A number of older white mineworkers on the Copperbelt had been involved
in these events.
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was discussed on 16 September at the Chiefs of Staff Committee in London,
where Winston Churchill ordered the army to deploy a battalion of white
troops from the Middle East as quickly as possible.93 A heavy presence of
troops was necessary, the Colonial Secretary warned, as “[t]he temper of the
workers on the Copper Belt is so inflammable that a strike might lead to
widespread sabotage and the destruction of mining machinery”.94
Despatching a battalion from the Middle East could take weeks and the
government feared that they would lose the initiative if action was delayed.
Instead, the Southern Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment, then stationed
at Moshi in Tanganyika, was deployed. On 5 October, hundreds of troops
from this regiment were moved under conditions of strictest secrecy to all
the Copperbelt towns. A duplicate key to Maybank’s flat was obtained,
allowing troops to arrest him there in the early morning. Luckily, he had left
his pistol in his car the previous night.95 Soldiers also quickly apprehended
Chris Meyer, another prominent union member at Mufulira, and Jacobus
Theunissen, who was not a union member but an Ossewa Brandwag
activist, and removed them from the Copperbelt by plane.96 These troops
then remained on the Copperbelt for two weeks.97
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
Taken by surprise, the NRMWU reacted furiously and immediately began
preparing for industrial action on the Copperbelt, while at the same time
utilizing the personal and political connections of their members to rally the
labour movement internationally. Campaigns were soon underway in
Britain, South Africa, and Australia. Meyer, who had been rapidly removed
to South Africa, was well-connected among the trade-union movement
there as he had previously worked on the Rand. He had been on SAMWU’s
General Council and an active member of the South African Labour Party
93. TNA, CAB 79/57/32, Reinforcements for Northern Rhodesia, 16 September 1942; TNA,
PREM 4/43A/4, Note from Viscount Cranbourne, 24 September 1942. Viscount Cranbourne
(Robert Gascoyne-Cecil) was Colonial Secretary from February to November 1942.
94. TNA, PREM 4/43A/4, Note from Viscount Cranbourne, 19 September 1942.
95. TNA, CO 795/122/13, Letter from Governor Waddington to Oliver Stanley, 11 December
1942.
96. Theunissen does not appear to have been connected with the other two men. Ossewa
Brandwag was a far-right paramilitary movement in South Africa, where the organization had
been attempting to carry out a sabotage campaign in opposition to South African involvement in
the war. Several hundred suspected members were detained in South Africa during 1942, and
Theunissen’s arrest appears to have been part of this process. See Patrick J. Furlong, Between
Crown and Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in
the Fascist Era (Hanover, NH, 1991), p. 144.
97. TNA, CO 795/122/15, Telegram from General Officer Commanding, East Africa to War
Office, 21 October 1942.
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and was thus well placed to initiate a campaign against the deportations.98
To assist him in this, the NRMWU despatched Jim Purvis to South Africa.
Purvis – a surface electrician at Roan Antelope who had been a founding
member of the NRMWU – also had considerable experience in the trade-
union movement and on the international circuits of white labour. Born in
Australia, Purvis had been an active member of the AWU in Queensland,
worked in a foundry in northern England, returned to Australia and then
left again for South Africa after a stint in prison, and was in Johannesburg
during the Rand Revolt before ending up on the Copperbelt in the late
1920s.99 He too was well-known in the trade-union movement in South
Africa. Purvis, however, had been deeply antagonistic towards other leading
members of the union in the past – repeatedly expressing his hostility towards
Maybank, Hodgson, Ross, and Murray to managers and government
officials – though he closed rankswhenMaybank andMeyer were arrested.100
This antagonism would subsequently be effectively used by the Governor to
derail the campaign.101
Purvis, Meyer, Jack Hodgson (who had been declared a prohibited
immigrant and refused re-entry into Northern Rhodesia in 1941), Erica
Hodgson, and Sarah Zaremba, the NRMWU’s acting general secretary,
formed a committee in Johannesburg to rally international support to
return Maybank to the Copperbelt. The language used by this committee
and the NRMWU more generally is significant and is worth examining. It
was class-orientated and internationalist and reflected both the radical politics
of those writing it and their awareness of what would appeal to international
audiences. They avoided using overtly racist language, but also did not include
expressions of support for the African workforce or any acknowledgement
that African workers had any role to play in these disputes.
On the Copperbelt, the initial statement of the NRMWU, which appears
to have been drawn up by the union’s President Murray, though also signed
by the rest of the union’s General Council, denounced the “jingoism,
98. HPA, AH 646 Dc12.20, Resumé of Events Leading up to and Including the Arrests of the
Trade Union Leaders (undated). The document was compiled by Erica Hogdson and the
Johannesburg NRMWU committee.
99. “‘Lightning Jimmy’ Is In There, Swinging for theMineworkers”,NorthernNews, 29October
1958; National Archives of Australia, Canberra [hereafter, NAA], MT1139/1, Record since
landing: J.F. Purvis (undated).
100. ZCCM, 15.1.6E, Notes on interview with J. Purvis, 20 March 1940. Even after the Roan
branch rejoined the NRMWU, Purvis and other union members at Roan Antelope remained
privately bitter about their treatment from other NRMWU branches during the split, and the
failure of these branches to support their dispute to get a sacked American miner reinstated at
Roan Antelope in 1939. This appears to have been behind the antagonism between Purvis and
other leading NRMWU members.
101. NASA, ARB 119/5 1193, Meeting between His Excellency the Governor and the General
Council of the Mine Workers’ Union.
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misinterpretation, lies, propagated by a whispering campaign instigated by
a quasi-fascist minority”, that had led to an “attack upon the working man’s
organisation […] a deliberate attempt to smash that organisation and throw
the workers into a state of chaos”. The General Council acknowledged,
furthermore, that the main struggle was “between the great social democratic
idea on the one hand and the powerful Nazi-fascist idea on the other”.102
This statement was rapidly distributed to the union’s international supporters
and communist and left-wing Labour MPs in the House of Commons were
soon pressing the Colonial Secretary to release Maybank.103 Statements
issued by the Johannesburg committee were addressed to “the Trades Union
and Labour Movements of the Democratic Countries and all Workers of the
Allied Nations whos [sic] Interests are those of the Worker”, but made no
mention of Africans other than denying the allegation that Maybank and
Meyer had been organizing groups of African mineworkers.104
Purvis was sent to tour South Africa and used similar language in the
statement he delivered to white trade unions across the country. The
NRMWU, he assured South African trade unions, was “doing everything
in its power to bring about the defeat of Nazi Germany and Fascism”.105
Purvis was able to secure support from a range of white trade unions –
including the powerful SAMWU – and from the South African Trades and
Labour Council (SATLC).106 These unions sent joint delegations with the
NRMWU to lobby the South African Government and crucially helped
obtain the support of the British Trade Union Congress (TUC).107 Con-
sequently, the TUC sent delegations, including its General Secretary Walter
Citrine, to the British Government demanding Maybank’s release and
urged its local affiliates around the UK to join this campaign.108 The
breadth of this campaign and the extent of the NRMWU’s network of
supporters are perhaps best indicated by the protest letter from Romford
Trades Council, a local trade-union association near London, to the
102. HPA, AH 646 Dc12.20, Memorandum from the General Council, NRMWU to the
Governor of Northern Rhodesia (undated).
103. See the corresponding parliamentary transcripts in Hansard: 21 October 1942 vol. 383
cc1954–1956; 16 December 1942 vol. 385 cc1962–1963.
104. HPA, AH 646 Dc12.20, Resumé of Events Leading up to and Including the Arrests of the
Trade Union Leaders.
105. HPA, AH 646 Dc12.20, Memorandum submitted on behalf of the Northern Rhodesia Mine
Workers’ Union by Mr J. Purvis.
106. See HPA, AH 646 Dc12.20, Letter from Secretary, SAMWU to Secretariat, NRMWU,
17 December 1942 for an account of how SAMWU and the SALTC helped begin the campaign in
South Africa after the SAMWU National Executive Committee discussed Purvis’s report on
27 November 1942.
107. “Deportation of Copperbelt Miners: S.A. Labour Council to take Action”, Johannesburg
Star, 2 December 1942.
108. HPA, AH 646 Dc12.20, Telegram from Walter Citrine to William de Vries, 18 December
1942. William de Vries was General Secretary of the SALTC.
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Colonial Office, which echoed the NRMWU’s wider demands virtually
word for word.109
The SALTC and the Johannesburg NRMWU committee also spread the
campaign to Australia, as they called on the support of mineworkers’
unions there.110 The Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation took
up the campaign and called on Prime Minister John Curtin and the Labour
Government to help the union establish an “Australia-wide campaign to
demand that the Rhodesian Government allow Maybank and Meyer to
carry on their union activities”.111 In Australia, as well as in Britain and
South Africa, the trade-union movement saw a commonality of interest
with the Copperbelt’s white mineworkers, and saw that the actions of the
Northern Rhodesian Government threatened these interests.
These connections were bolstered by Maybank’s own radical political
links. Independently of the SALTC, a friend of Maybank tipped off The
Ironworker, the paper of Federated Ironworkers’ Association of Australia,
that one of their readers had been detained in Northern Rhodesia for
allegedly undermining the war effort. “The victim of this patently absurd
charge is Frank Maybank”, explained The Ironworker, “a staunch anti-
Fascist and first-rate trade unionist”, who was “well-known in W.A.
[Western Australia] industrial circles”.112 This statement was reprinted in
the CPA newspaper Tribune, which added “[t]he Australian labor move-
ment must utter a mass protest” against the detentions.113 Protests from the
Ironworkers’ Association calling for Maybank and Meyer’s immediate
release soon followed, to governments in both Australia and South
Africa.114 Similarly, ties to Britain were strengthened through Maybank’s
involvement in the communist movement. The Communist Party of South
Africa’s newspaper The Guardian worked closely with the NRMWU
committee in Johannesburg, and the publication was circulated on the
Copperbelt by the NRMWU.115 The Guardian’s championing of the white
109. TNA, CO 195/122/16, Letter from G.A. Andrews, Romford & Hornchurch Trades
Council to Consul, Africa House, 4 December 1942.
110. “African Miners’ Call to Australia for Support”, Maryborough Chronicle, 24 December
1942. The Maryborough Chronicle was a newspaper in Queensland, Australia. The same article
was reprinted in other Australian newspapers around the same time.
111. “Miners Seek Federal Aid”, Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners’ Advocate, 6 January
1943. The Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners’ Advocate was a newspaper in New South
Wales, Australia. In several sources Chris Meyer’s last name is spelt “Maeyer”.
112. NAA, A989, 1943/241/1, cutting from The Ironworker (undated).
113. “South Africa Interns a Militant’, Tribune, 6 January 1943.
114. NAA, A989, 1943/241/1, Letter from B. Flanagan to H.V. Evatt, 29 January 1943. Evatt was
the Australian Minister for External Affairs; NASA, BTS 9/77/6A, Telegram from Flanagan,
Australian Ironworkers’ Union to General Smuts (undated).
115. “Release Maybank & Maeyer: Mine Workers’ Ultimatum”, The Guardian, 3 December
1942. This article reprints a recent statement from the NRMWU. The Guardian itself did not
mention the industrial colour bar on the Copperbelt, but notes that the arrest of Maybank and
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mineworkers’ cause brought the support of British communists. “The
Rhodesian copper miners are fighting”, reported the Communist Party of
Great Britain, which urged its supporters to back them as they echoed the
NRMWU’s demand for an inquiry into copper production.116
Despite the support of Romford Trades Council, the campaign proved
insufficient and Maybank was deported from Northern Rhodesia to the
UK in late December 1942. The NRMWU was effectively competing with
the international networks of the British Empire and, to a lesser extent, the
mining companies and came off worst. The mining companies had been
pressing the colonial administration and the British Government to take
action since late 1940, and furnished them with incriminating evidence
against Maybank from the Chamber of Mines in Western Australia, which
was added to the case against him.117 The networks of empire proved highly
effective in combating and contradicting the information disseminated
by the NRMWU and its allies, especially when provided with highly
damaging allegations by the Northern Rhodesian Government. In Northern
Rhodesia, the campaign had been seriously undermined when Governor
Waddington revealed to the NRMWU leadership on 27 November that it
was Purvis himself who had complained to the Governor in mid-1942 that
“the position was extremely critical on the Copperbelt”, as Maybank was
stirring up trouble over wages. Purvis had added, unsolicited, that Meyer
was a leader of Ossewa Brandwag and “was the most dangerous man on
the Copperbelt”, and the Governor claimed this is why he had to act.118
Unsurprisingly, this provoked a huge internal row in the union, and the
planned strike on the Copperbelt was cancelled.119
This information was included in a short statement by the Governor and
was used to successfully derail campaigns over the deportations wherever
the NRMWU had managed to start them. The allegations followed Purvis
to South Africa and were circulated among mining unions there, prompting
several to repudiate their support for the NRMWU.120 In Britain, the TUC
Meyer had occurred because of “Rhodesian miners’ efforts to stand by their fellow workers” in
Belgian Congo. See ZNA, SEC1/1758,Nkana Mineworkers’ Review, Christmas 1941 for a good
example of the NRMWU reprinting material from The Guardian, in this case a piece on fascist
elements in the British Conservative Party and the Soviet war effort.
116. “Fight over Copper”, Daily Worker, 10 December 1942.
117. ZCCM, 3.8.2A, Letter from F.A. Unger, Anglo American to S.S. Taylor, Rhokana
Corporation, 12 August 1940. The information was that Maybank had been an active member of
the Communist Party of Australia. S.S. Taylor was managing director of Rhokana Corporation.
118. NASA, ARB 119/5 1193, Meeting between His Excellency the Governor and the General
Council of the Mine Workers’ Union.
119. TNA, CO 795/122/16, Telegram from Waddington to Colonial Secretary, 27 November
1942.
120. NASA, ARB 119/5 1193, Letter from the Chief Secretary, Lusaka to Department of Labour,
Pretoria, 4 December 1942.
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quietly dropped the campaign after learning of Purvis’s role.121 Bertie
Brodrick, SAMWU’s general secretary, even visited the Copperbelt in late
December 1942 to dampen the NRMWU campaign, and declared publicly
there that the deportation was not an attempt to break the union.122
Brodrick’s statement was despatched to Australia, and forwarded to the
Miners’ Federation by the authorities.123
In trying to prevent the deportation of Maybank and Meyer, the
campaign was a failure. However, the NRMWU kept up the pressure
and the subsequent demand – that Maybank be allowed to return to the
Copperbelt – succeeded in catching the imagination of the British trade-
union movement again. That this cause was related implicitly – via the fear
of a Katanga-like composition of labour being introduced in the Copperbelt –
to racial exclusivity passed without comment in the British labour movement.
Almost as soon as Maybank arrived in the UK, he was presented first and
foremost as a victimized trade unionist.
Maybank met Citrine in April 1943 and then appeared before the TUC
General Council in June, where he convinced members that he had been
deported as a result of his legitimate trade-union activities.124 Maybank also
won the support of the Mineworkers’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB),
under whose auspices he toured Britain’s coalfields to make his case.
Ebby Edwards, the union’s General Secretary, reported that Maybank
“hadmade an excellent impression on all the District Officers of theMiners’
Union”.125 Abe Moffat, the communist mineworkers’ leader from Fife,
raised the matter at the TUC annual congress in September 1943 and
compared Maybank’s case to trade unionists exiled from Nazi-occupied
Europe. The MFGB, Moffat announced, could vouch for Maybank’s
integrity and he called on the whole British trade-union movement to back
the demand that Maybank be allowed to return to Northern Rhodesia.126
121. HPA, AH 646 Dc12.20, Telegram from Walter Citrine to William de Vries, 26 December
1942.
122. TNA, CO 795/122/13, Telegram from Governor Waddington to Colonial Secretary,
8 January 1943.
123. Ibid., Telegram from Dominion Office to British High Commission, Canberra, 1 February
1943; NAA, A989, 1943/241/1, Letter from John Curtin to H. Wells, 9 February 1943. Wells was
president of the Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation.
124. TNA, CO 795/122/13, Letter from Walter Citrine to Oliver Stanley, 9 April 1943 and
10 June 1943.
125. TNA, CO 795/122/13, Notes of a meeting held in the Secretary of State’s room on
7 December 1943. Ebby Edwards and Citrine had a meeting with the Colonial Secretary to
demand that Maybank be allowed to return to the Copperbelt. Edwards also claimed that he had
received many letters fromminers all across Britain asking for the matter to be raised in the House
of Commons and at the TUC.
126. Report of the Proceedings at the 75th Annual Trades Union Congress (London, 1943),
pp. 287–288.
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The major breakthrough in the campaign, however, came in February
1945 when Goodwin, by then NRMWU president, was elected as one of
the twenty-two members of the Executive of theWorld Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU) as the representative for Africa.127 The deportations were
still a live issue on the Copperbelt, and Goodwin pledged to raise the matter
at the WFTU before leaving.128 Goodwin was as good as his word, and
pursued the matter with the TUC, MFGB Executive, and the WFTU. He
also secured a visitor’s ticket to get Maybank into the conference, where
Maybank raised the matter himself among delegates and got himself elected
to the WFTU General Council.129
Goodwin had won the NRMWU a potentially powerful position in the
global trade-union movement at the same time as the war was drawing to a
close. The urgent need for copper was dissipating at the same time as trade-
union pressure was increasing. With these new developments, it did not
take long for the British Government to give in, and in March 1945
Goodwin and Citrine finally secured what they perceived as justice for
Maybank. The British Government reluctantly allowed him to return to
Northern Rhodesia following the end of hostilities in Europe. Anticipating
that support for this demand would only grow, it was thought best to
announce the decision quickly to “avoid appearing to have given way to
pressure”.130 To the undisguised dismay of the mining companies, Maybank
was unanimously reinstated as NRMWU General Secretary in August
1945. He rapidly resumed his previous role, vowing to shut down the entire
Copperbelt following a strike at Mufulira Mine and, for good measure,
turning up late at night at the house of the magistrate who had him deported
to threaten him in person.131
CONCLUSION
The struggles of the white mineworkers on the Copperbelt during this
period reveal how they saw themselves and their interests: as a transna-
tional, mobile workforce where conditions of work and wage levels had to
be maintained and improved in multiple locations. In many ways, what was
happening in mining regions in Britain, South Africa, Australia, and the
127. International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, World Federation of Trade Unions
Archives 10, Documents on the Second World Trade Union Conference and the First World
Trade Union Congress (Paris, 25 September–8 October 1945): Report of the Committee on
Nominations to the General Council, the Executive Committee and the Auditors.
128. ZNA, SEC1/1404, Telegram from Governor Waddington to Colonial Secretary, 13 January
1945.
129. TNA, CO 795/128/5, Extracts from the NRMWU President’s Report on Trip to England,
12 April 1945.
130. TNA, CAB/65/49/36, Conclusions of War Cabinet, 26 March 1945.
131. TNA, CO 795/128/5, Statement from Ronald Ormiston Sinclair, 16 August 1945.
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United States was of more relevance than developments in Northern
Rhodesia, and this international context is crucial to understanding events
on the wartime Copperbelt. The mineworkers’ perception of their place in
the labour movement was reciprocated and white mineworkers were able to
mobilize support from trade unions in South Africa, Britain, Australia, and
eventually the Soviet-dominated WFTU. For trade unionists in these
countries, the world of European labour on the Copperbelt was similar
enough for white mineworkers there to be recognized as comrades. For
white mineworkers, relevant and natural allies were to be sought inter-
nationally among the trade unions formed by the British labour diaspora
across the world, not locally.
This did begin to change during the 1940s. In the March 1940 strikes, it
appeared that white mineworkers still held to what Keith Breckenridge
referred to as “the key rule of white labour disputes” in South Africa in the
1920s: African workers were to be kept out of disputes between white
workers and their employers.132 Although their strikes in 1940 threw
thousands of African miners out of work and helped provoke serious
African labour unrest, there was no acknowledgement that the dispute
concerned them at all. By 1943, though, NRMWU branches began to
explore the possibility of organizing African workers, although few prac-
tical steps were taken until after the war.133 In some ways this represents a
move away from the politics of white labourism, but in another sense it does
not. Rather than exclude non-whites, as white labourists had attempted to
do elsewhere, African workers were to be incorporated as junior branches
in a trade-union structure which would remain controlled by Europeans.
There was no real challenge to the substance of the politics of white
labourism on the Copperbelt during this period as it was generally
acknowledged among the white workforce that industrial militancy and
racial exclusivity indisputably got results. They enabled white mineworkers
to win some of the most favourable working conditions and highest wages
on the planet by the 1950s. While not overtly racist or even particularly
hostile to the much larger African workforce, radicals among the white
workforce did not see African workers as their constituency. They can thus
be described as passive white labourists who tacitly took the established
order of things for granted or pushed, without resorting overtly to a racist
ideology, to maintain the status quo. This is why Maybank could declare,
without any note of contradiction: “[A]t Mufulira we took the stand that
notwithstanding religion, race or politics, we are solid as workers.”134
132. Keith Breckenridge, “Fighting for a White South Africa: White Working-Class Racism and
the 1922 Rand Revolt”, South African Historical Journal, 57 (2007), pp. 228–243, 238.
133. Meebelo, African Proletarians, p. 171.
134. ZCCM, 3.8.1A, Notes of meeting of mineworkers held in Cinema Hall, Nkana on Tuesday,
19 March 1940.
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Wildcat strikes in support of their radical demands – which by logical
consequence were racially exclusionary –were for white workers “the only
action which will bring immediate and certain results”, and the success of
these tactics proved an instructive experience.135 Further major strikes hit
all four mines in 1944 and in 1946, winning further concessions, and this
informed a postwar strategy of intransigence in negotiations with the
mining companies. Effectively, the victory won by white mineworkers in
March 1940 helped alter the pattern of industrial relations in the mines for
the subsequent two decades. Relatively few mineworkers broke with the
politics of white labourism, and none did so more dramatically than Jack
Hodgson, who went on to engage in armed struggle against the apartheid
regime in South Africa.136 His example is all the more dramatic because it
was virtually unique; the vast majority of his former workmates were
comfortable with their position in the world of European labour or at least
accepted the racialized segregation of labour it implied.
This world would soon be disrupted in the postwar years by the emer-
gence of a powerful African mineworkers’ union. African miners were soon
making demands that theNRMWUcould not ignore and would contest the
place of the NRMWU in the international labour movement. The combi-
nation of industrial militancy and racial exclusivity, both of which white
mineworkers saw as necessary to protect their interests, would become
increasingly out of place in the postwar world. Yet the position of strength
won by the NRMWU through its wartime struggles and its continued
willingness to defend this position effectively insulated the white workforce
from these wider changes until the late 1960s.
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Duncan Money. Le monde du travail européen sur la Ceinture de cuivre en Rhodésie
du Nord, 1940–1945.
Cet article examine les expériences de travailleurs blancs sur la Ceinture de cuivre en
Rhodésie du Nord pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Une grande partie de la
littérature existante sur cette région se concentre sur le travail africain, mais le boom qui
commença dans l’exploitation minière du cuivre attira également des milliers tra-
vailleurs européens mobiles et en transit. Ces travailleurs faisaient partie d’une diaspora
du travail principalement anglophone, avec une portée mondiale qui lia des centres
miniers répartis dans le monde entier. L’expérience de cette main d’œuvre engendra
des tendances apparemment contradictoires de militantisme ouvrier, de radicalisme
politique et d’exclusivité raciale. L’étude de deux événements significatifs pendant cette
135. ZNA, SEC/1383, Letter from Governor JohnMaybin to MalcolmMacDonald, 2 April 1940.
136. Neil Roos, Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa,
1939–1961 (Aldershot, 2005), p.175.
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période tentera de révéler comment ces tendances modelèrent les événements sur la
Ceinture de cuivre: les grèves sauvages de 1940 et l’arrestation et la déportation des
leaders syndicalistes de mineurs blancs. Ces événements attirèrent l’attention sur le
monde international du travail européen, et illustrent comment la Ceinture de cuivre
était liée à d’autres centres miniers mondiaux.
Traduction: Christine Plard
Duncan Money. Die Welt der europäischen Arbeiter im nordrhodesischen Kupfergürtel,
1940–1945.
Der Beitrag erkundet die Erfahrungen weißer Arbeiter im sogenannten “Kupfergürtel”,
einem Bergbaugebiet in Nordrhodesien, während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Ein Großteil
der vorhandenen Literatur zur Region konzentriert sich auf die Arbeit von Afrikanern,
der im Kupferbergbau anhebende Boom zog jedoch auch tausende von mobilen,
wandernden europäischen Arbeitern an. Diese Arbeiter waren Teil einer überwiegend
englischsprachigen Diaspora globalen Ausmaßes, die Bergbauzentren auf der ganzen
Welt verband. Die von diesen Arbeitskräften gesammelten Erfahrungen erzeugten
scheinbar widersprüchliche Trends der Arbeitermilitanz, des politischen Radikalismus
und der rassialen Exklusion. Anhand von zwei bedeutenden Ereignissen des Zeitraums
wird versucht zu klären, wie dadurch die Vorkommnisse im “Kupfergürtel” geprägt
wurden: Untersucht werden die wilden Streiks von 1940 und die 1942 erfolgte Verhaf-
tung und Ausweisung weißer Bergbaugewerkschaftsführer. Diese Ereignisse werfen ein
Licht auf die internationaleWelt der europäischenArbeiter und veranschaulichen, wie der
“Kupfergürtel” mit anderen Bergbauzentren auf der ganzen Welt in Verbindung stand.
Übersetzung: Max Henninger
Duncan Money. El mundo de los trabajadores europeos en el “cinturón de cobre” de
Rhodesia del Norte, 1940–1945.
Este artículo se adentra en las experiencias de los trabajadores blancos en el “cinturón de
cobre” en Rhodesia del Norte durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Gran parte de la
literatura que existe sobre la región se centra en el trabajo de los africanos, si bien el creci-
miento que se dio de la industria minera del cobre también atrajo a miles de trabajadores
blancos en tránsito y de forma temporal. Estos trabajadores fueron parte de una diáspora
muy importante de trabajadores angloparlantes con un alcance global que vinculaba difer-
entes centros mineros alrededor del mundo. La experiencia de esta fuerza de trabajo generó
tendencias aparentemente contradictorias combinando la militancia sindical, el radicalismo
político y la exclusividad racial. Centrándose en dos acontecimientos significativos durante
el periodo indicado tratamos de examinar como este tipo de tendencias condicionó los
acontecimientos en el “cinturón de cobre”: las huelgas salvajes de 1940 y el arresto y
deportación de líderes sindicalesmineros blancos en 1942. Estos dos hechos aportan algo de
luz sobre el mundo internacional de los trabajadores europeos y permiten ilustrar como el
“cinturón de cobre” estaba vinculado a otros centros mineros en otras partes del planeta.
Traducción: Vicent Sanz Rozalén
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